A rapid review suggests that there has been a significant shift in the strategic priorities on African affairs and global health policy that have been pursued in formal engagements by the majority members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC). <\/p>\n
Over the first 160 days, the formal engagements of the majority members were not as strongly aligned with the strategic priorities of countering global health threats and strengthening democratic institutions as they were with the strategic priorities of ending regional conflicts, realigning US foreign policy, promoting human rights, countering the diplomatic engagement of malign actors and countering the predatory practices of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). <\/p>\n
That is a curious finding. It means that those formal engagements were not perfectly aligned with the strategic priorities for SFRC engagement on African affairs and global health policy that were declared by the relevant subcommittee chair during the first 160 days of either the last session or the current one. <\/p>\n
In turn, that raises a number of follow-on questions of policy relevance. One is whether there is partisan agreement on the strategic priorities for African affairs and global health policy among the majority members. Another is whether there is bipartisan agreement that the promotion of human rights should be a strategic priority among the majority and minority members. Media outlets and think tanks should seek to provide answers to those questions.<\/p>\n
Strategic priorities<\/strong><\/p>\n A rapid review shows that there were significant changes in the strategic priorities for African affairs and global health policy that were declared by the respective chair of the SFRC Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy within the first 160 days of the current session versus the last one.<\/p>\n Current session<\/strong><\/p>\n At the start of this session, the current subcommittee chair articulated six strategic priorities for engagement. In the press release following his appointment, Senator Ted Cruz announced<\/a> that he was committed to a strong hearings schedule and oversight agenda that would seek to bridge the artificial divide that exists across geographic regions. Specifically, he declared that the subcommittee would focus on five strategic priorities. They included countering the diplomatic engagement of malign actors, countering the predatory practices of the CCP, countering security threats posed by international terrorist organisations, protecting freedom of navigation in the vicinity of the Red Sea, and mitigating illicit activities of those seeking to exploit financial systems. <\/p>\n A few weeks later, Cruz held a roundtable<\/a> with the ambassadors of 19 independent states on the African continent. At that meeting, he not only reiterated that the subcommittee would focus on the predatory practices of the CCP (for example, the Belt and Road Initiative). He added that the subcommittee would focus on a sixth strategic priority: ensuring reliable access to energy and critical minerals resources. <\/p>\n Last session<\/strong><\/p>\n In the prior session, the former subcommittee chair articulated a very different set of strategic priorities for engagement. In the press release following his appointment, Senator Corey Booker declared<\/a> that the subcommittee would focus on the strategic priorities of promoting human rights, countering global health threats, boosting trade and economic investment, strengthening democratic institutions, and increasing cooperation on non-traditional security challenges (for example, climate change and food insecurity). To counter global health threats, Booker stressed<\/a> that the subcommittee would focus on issues related to pandemic preparedness, immunisation expansion, and reauthorisation of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (Pepfar). In the US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa<\/em><\/a>, the Biden administration had declared that it was a national security priority for the US government to address the artificial bureaucratic seams<\/a> that exist between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. But Booker made no mention of that national strategic priority.<\/p>\n Committee engagement<\/strong><\/p>\n A rapid review of the hearings, chair press releases and subcommittee chair press releases shows that there was a similar level of SFRC majority engagement on African affairs and global health policy over the first 160 days of the current session versus the last one.<\/p>\n Committee hearings\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n In the current session, the SFRC held two committee hearings that were specifically focused on African affairs and global health policy. The first took place on 13 May 2025. It was a full committee hearing<\/a> on East Africa and the Horn of Africa. The second took place on 4 June 2025. It was a subcommittee hearing<\/a> on China\u2019s malign influence in Africa. That hearing built upon an earlier full committee hearing<\/a> on the malign influence of the People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC) at home and abroad. That earlier hearing took place on 30 January 2025. In addition to those committee hearings, the committee held fourteen nomination hearings. None were for US ambassadors to independent states on the African continent.<\/p>\n In the last session, the SFRC held two committee hearings on African affairs and global health policy over the same period. The first took place on 19 April 2023. It was a full committee hearing<\/a> on Pepfar. The second took place on 10 May 2023. It was a full committee hearing<\/a> on the Sudanese civil war. There was also a subcommittee hearing<\/a> on US relations with Tunisia. That took place on 26 April 2023. It was held by the Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism. In addition to those committee hearings, the committee held eight nomination hearings. Unlike the current session, nine were for US ambassadors to independent states on the African continent (Cabo Verde<\/a>; Djibouti<\/a>; Ethiopia<\/a>; Niger<\/a>; Nigeria<\/a>; Rwanda<\/a>; Sierra Leone<\/a>; Uganda<\/a>; Zimbabwe<\/a>).<\/p>\n Committee majority press<\/strong><\/p>\n In the current session, the SFRC majority press featured six official statements on African affairs and global health policy. The first was an official statement on the Sudanese genocide determination<\/a>. It was released on 7 January 2025. The next three were on Sudanese sanctions<\/a>, the M23 campaign<\/a> (Democratic Republic of the Congo), and African peacekeeping operations accountability<\/a>. They were followed by the chair\u2019s official remarks<\/a> at the full committee hearing on East Africa and the Horn of Africa. The last was an official statement on the proxy conflict between Rwanda and the DRC<\/a>. It was released on 23 May 2025. <\/p>\n In the last session, the SFRC majority press also featured six official statements on African affairs and global health policy. The first was an official statement on Nigerian elections<\/a>. It was released on 9 February 2023. The next two were official statements on Rwandan political persecution<\/a> and the Sudanese civil war<\/a>. Those were followed by the Chairman\u2019s official remarks at the full committee hearings on Pepfar reauthorisation<\/a> and the Sudanese civil war<\/a>. The last was an official statement on the murder of U.S. government employees in Nigeria<\/a>. It was released on 17 May 2023. <\/p>\n Subcommittee chair press<\/strong><\/p>\n In the current session, the press for the subcommittee chair featured three official statements on African affairs and global health policy. The first was an announcement<\/a> that Cruz would serve as the subcommittee chair. It was released on 3 February 2025. That was followed by an official statement on a congressional roundtable with African ambassadors<\/a>. The last was an official statement on a new Bill<\/a> to abolish the United States African Development Foundation (USADF).<\/p>\n In the last session, the press for the subcommittee chair featured five official statements on African affairs and global health policy. The first was on Nigerian elections<\/a>. It was released on 24 February 2023. The next was an announcement<\/a> that Booker would serve as the subcommittee chair. That was followed by official statements on the M23 campaign<\/a> (DRC) and the Sudanese civil war<\/a>. The last was on the Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Act<\/a>. It was released on 8 June 2023.<\/p>\n Analytic synthesis<\/strong><\/p>\n A synthesis of the research findings suggests that there has not been a perfect match between the formal engagements of majority members and the strategic priorities declared by the current subcommittee chair over the first 160 days of the current session. Generally speaking, those formal engagements have not been strongly aligned with at least two of the strategic priorities declared by Booker during the first 160 days of the last session (that is, countering global health threats; strengthening democratic institutions). They have been more aligned with:<\/p>\n That raises follow-on questions of policy relevance. One is whether the historic pursuit of nomination approvals significantly impacted the strategic priorities that were pursued on African affairs and global health policy during the first 160 days of the current session. Another is whether there was partisan collective agreement on the strategic objectives for African affairs and global health policy among the majority members during the first 160 days of the current session. Yet another is whether there was bipartisan agreement that the promotion of human rights should be a strategic priority for African affairs and global health policy among the majority and minority committee members during the first 160 days of the current session. If so, then that raises the question of why the current subcommittee chair did not declare the promotion of human rights to be a strategic priority in response to domestic political concerns. Of course, there are many others. For example, why did the current subcommittee chair not declare eliminating trade deficits, increasing US exports and investment in Africa, and driving mutual prosperity<\/a> to be top-level strategic priorities? Commercial diplomacy was highlighted in the testimony<\/a> of the senior bureau official for the Bureau of African Affairs in the US department of state, Troy Fitrell, at the subcommittee hearing<\/a> on China’s malign influence in Africa.<\/p>\n Beyond the synthesis, the rapid review suggests that the current organisational structures of the SFRC subcommittees and State Department bureaus may not be optimised for the achievement of the current strategic priorities for African affairs. Like last session, there are hard jurisdictional boundaries drawn between North Africa affairs and sub-Saharan Africa affairs. Those probably impede the bridging of the artificial divide that exists between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa in African affairs. Moreover, there are blurred jurisdictional boundaries drawn between African affairs and global health policy. That may have made sense when countering global health threats was one of the strategic priorities for African affairs. However, it makes less sense now that countering global health threats has been downgraded as a strategic priority for African affairs.<\/p>\n Research limitations<\/strong><\/p>\n The scope of the rapid review was exploratory in nature. As one would expect, it follows that there are several important limitations that merit consideration.<\/p>\n First, the rapid review only critically examined a subset of the formal engagements on African affairs and global health policy by the majority members. Missing formal engagements include draft legislation and staff delegations. Their inclusion could have a significant impact on the research findings. There was draft legislation on African affairs and staff delegations to African countries during the first 160 days of the current session.<\/p>\n Second, the rapid review did not critically examine informal engagements on African affairs and global health policy by the majority members. Missing informal engagements included social media posts. Their inclusion could have a significant impact on the research findings. There were majority leadership posts on African affairs on social media during the first 160 days of the current session. Moreover, social media was a major platform for engagement. As evidence, the SFRC Chairman\u2019s recent social media post<\/a> on the ties between Kenya and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) attracted over 650,000 views.<\/p>\n Third, the rapid review only critically examined one period of time. That could have had a significant impact on the research findings. There were intervening events that took place over the first 160 days of the current session. One was a change in administration<\/a>. Another was the majority leadership decision to pursue a historical number of nominee approvals<\/a> in the first 100 days. Those events almost certainly had a significant impact on the background context. For that reason, the research findings could have been different if another period of time had been selected (for example, first 100 days of the new administration<\/a>).<\/p>\n There is therefore a clear and present opportunity to improve the general knowledge about the engagement of the SFRC on African affairs and global health policy by way of future research that is designed to address these research limitations.<\/p>\n Michael Walsh is a visiting scholar at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. Ambassador (Ret) Charles Ray is a member of the Board of Trustees and chair of the Africa Programme at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" A rapid review suggests that there has been a significant shift in the strategic priorities on African affairs and global health policy that have been pursued in formal engagements by the majority members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC). 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